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ABSTRACT
We analyse the potential costs and benefits of the EMU to assess the economic issues
facing Asian countries considering deep monetary cooperation. The EMU is facing an
Eastward expansion into Central and Eastern Europe; a more disparate group of countries
that the original EMU of 12. East Asia, similarly, includes countries with great
differences in income level and economic structure. There is a question to what extent
lessons from the current EMU extends to a group of countries with very different
economic structures as well as political systems.
We pay particular attention to two kinds of economic benefits and costs of the EU
that do not appear much in conventional economic analysis. First there are benefits and
costs of harmonization in different areas including the monetary area. Second, for many
countries membership in the EU can provide a kind of insurance against domestic
institutional, legal and political weaknesses. Although we emphasize economic
arguments it is necessary to recognize that the EU is very much a politically motivated
project. Politics, however, may well be the biggest obstacle to an EU like system in Asia.
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“Great Monetary Union—Pity about the economy”
Martin Wolf in Comments on Wyplosz (2006)
Introduction
Debate about regional integration in Asia has been inspired by the events in the
EU; in particular, the formation of the EMU in 1999 can be seen as a success in itself and
shown that fixing exchange rates irrevocably is a policy option. Since the aversion to
flexible exchange rates is widespread among Asian policymakers, the question arises
whether a policy initiative like the EMU can be implemented in East Asia as well.
The pressures on Asian countries with respect to currency policies have often
been spotty and even contradictory. The current constellation of pegged rates (e.g. China,
Singapore and Hong Kong pegged to the dollar, primarily, and South Korea pegged to a
basket of currencies) does not appear to have permanency and stability. China is being
pressured to float its currency while other countries simultaneously are encouraged to
narrow the bands of their pegs. China has begun to change the peg policy having realized
that the current structure is simply not sustainable.
The lessons from the last decade suggest that Asian financial markets are crisis
prone and that pegged exchange rates in the region are fragile indeed. The increasing
economic interdependence generated largely through trade and capital flows has
sharpened the interest in a regional approach to currency issues. One alternative is a fullfledged monetary union like the EMU but an alternative arrangement for irrevocable
fixing is dollarization. Softer forms of monetary cooperation are of course also available..
In this paper we analyse the potential costs and benefits of the EMU to assess the
economic issues facing Asian countries considering deep monetary cooperation in East
Asia in particular. The EMU is facing an Eastward expansion into Central and Eastern
Europe; a more disparate group of countries that the original EMU of 12. East Asia,
similarly, includes countries with great differences in income level and economic
structure. There is a question to what extent lessons from the current EMU extends to a
group of countries with very different economic structures as well as political systems.
We pay particular attention to two kinds of economic benefits and costs of the EU
that do not appear much in conventional economic analysis. First there are benefits and
costs of harmonization in different areas including the monetary area. Second, for many

2

countries membership in the EU can provide a kind of insurance against domestic
institutional, legal and political weaknesses. Although we emphasize economic
arguments it is necessary to recognize that the EU is very much a politically motivated
project. Politics, however, may well be the biggest obstacle to an EU like system in Asia.
The benefits and costs discussed here have a strong political component in that they
include institutional aspects of being a member vs. remaining a non-member.
Asia is well advised to consider the various mechanisms for political coordination
and integration. Structures like the EU and the EMU are but one option. They may have
worked well for those who joined and may well be very attractive for those in line, but
they need not necessarily be copied by Asia. However, Asia needs to learn from their
experiences, which we deal with here. The benefits and the costs of an EU and EMU
systems may well be different depending on the size of the country. We distinguish
between the EU and EMU decisions because participation in the EMU need not follow
from EU membership. There is substantial confusion in the literature about effects of the
EMU per se vs. the effects of EU membership more generally.
Many long term economic costs and benefits of EMU-membership are nearly
impossible to quantify since we do not know how the EU and its institutions will develop
beyond the time horizon of a few years. This uncertainty is compounded by the accession
of 12 countries with very different economic structures and institutions. We are not
attempting a quantitative evaluation here but focus on identifying costs and benefits that
may accrue over different time horizons. An important consideration is that EMU is only
one aspect of an integration process that has been going on for decades and encompasses
a wide array of political, public and legal institutions.
An evaluation of costs and benefits of monetary integration requires also a
reference point identifying what will happen if there is no currency union. The question
we ask is whether the benefits of EMU membership can be obtained by means of
alternative arrangements at lesser or higher costs. The corresponding question applies to
Asian economies considering joining a currency union. It could be that the interests of
some countries will be best served by keeping an independent economic system that
allows domestic institutions to develop to enhance economic growth and welfare based
on lasting comparative advantages, and by the pursuit of independent fiscal and monetary
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policies. In other countries the political situation may prevent growth oriented
institutional reforms as a result of interest group pressures. In these cases, participation in
regional integration initiatives can be the factor that makes some reform possible
although the proposed institutional structure need not be the most suitable for each
specific country. Thus the economic effects of regional integration efforts depend on a
combination of political and economic factors in each specific country, and they may be
hard to always sort out accurately.
The recent rejection of Lithuanian participation in the EMU indicates that the
decision to join the monetary union is not up to the individual country alone. 1 Similar
concerns can arise in Asia. A county’s choosing to join integration efforts need not
qualify by criteria of potential partners. Conflicts of interest can arise, since an important
consideration for some countries is to join integration efforts in order to obtain an
“insurance” against domestic political or institutional weaknesses while other countries
need not be willing to offer this type of insurance.
The rest of this paper discusses strengths and weaknesses of the EMU before
applying the lessons to Asia. The paper is divided into 5 sections. Section 1 provides an
overview of the different aspects of harmonization and insurance in Europe, as well as of
political and economic forces shaping integration in economic and political dimensions.
The broad categories of costs and benefits and alternative arrangements are specified in
this section. Macroeconomic adjustment issues arising as a result of monetary policy
harmonization in the EMU is the topic of Section 2, while microeconomic consequences
of payment system harmonization in the EMU are discussed in Section 3. The costs and
benefits identified in the previous sections are discussed from an Asian perspective in
Section 4. Finally, we summarize in Section 5 the implications for an Asian monetary
union and currency arrangements in Asia.
1. Dimensions of Harmonization and Insurance in the EU
One of the cornerstones for the integration of Europe was the Maastricht Treaty
established in 1991. The treaty provides for “… a single currency (the euro); provides the
EU with more power to deal with such matters as the environment, education, public
1

Lithuania’s inflation rate at 2.63 percent in 2005 was marginally higher than the average inflation rate of
the three best inflation performers in the EU. The average for these countries was 2.60 including nonEMU, floating rate Sweden.
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health, and communications among members; establish a common foreign and defence
policy; and create greater cooperation between the 12 police and justice systems”.
The introduction of a single currency has been viewed as the capstone for the
Internal Market project. From an economic point of view, the Internal Market project is
the key factor in an analysis of economic costs and benefits of the EU. This project is
intended to create an economically integrated region by means of the “four mobilities”;
mobility of goods, labor, capital and services. Mobility in these respects is then expected
to inevitably lead to “ever increasing integration”. The four mobilities are by no means
perfect, however. The recent referendum on a proposed EU constitution in France, in
particular, and the disagreements within the EU with respect to a mobility enhancing
Services Directive, indicate that there is strong resistance to economic integration in
several areas.
While the internal market project initially was focused on explicit barriers to
mobility within the EU, it was soon discovered that differences in rules and law for
economic activities hinder the integration process. For this reason the call for
harmonization of regulation, laws and other institutions in a number of areas has been
increasing on the grounds that differences create barriers to mobility. The formation of
the EMU can be seen as harmonization of monetary policy making institutions and the
means of payment.
The EU has the power to harmonize rules in many economic areas by means of
Directives agreed upon in the Council of Ministers. Individual countries are obliged to
introduce the Directives in their own legislation. Some areas remain outside the scope of
EU legislation, however. Fiscal powers remain on the national level as do education
systems, health care systems and social legislation more generally. These systems can
nevertheless be affected by the EU in important ways, since mobility of, for example,
labor, constrains the ability of the individual country to tax.
Political and other non-economic aspects of the EU cannot be neglected. The
Copenhagen criteria for EU membership refer to democratic institutions, the rule of law,
and human rights. These must be met by each country before joining the EU. The
Maastricht Treaty includes calls for integration in areas of defence and security. Political
considerations determine how far integration can go in these areas. But even if formal
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integration does not go far with respect to security and defence issues, there are important
political consequences of membership in the EU. Benefits or costs of a political nature
may well overshadow the economic ones, especially for Central and Eastern European
countries. An EU-membership may well provide the ultimate insurance policy against
reversion to communism or Russian domination to a higher degree than NATO
membership alone. If there is an economic price to EU membership, it could be easily
overshadowed by political considerations. For example, the ‘Keep the Bear at Bay”
strategy is clearly dominant in Eastern Europe considering its history between 1945 and
1989.
Another type of political insurance of EU membership refers to political and legal
institutions. Several new members do not have strong democratic traditions and their
legal institutions are weak. EU membership enhances the credibility of democratic
political institutions and the legal framework of the EU provides some access to the
European court system in cases where fundamental rights of individuals and firms are
violated. The political importance of this type of insurance varies across states. This
variation can be illustrated by the differences in attitudes to sovereignty of political and
legal institutions across the EU.
Citizens’ trust in domestic political institutions, government authorities, and legal
institutions varies greatly within the EU and this variation has increased with the
Eastward expansion. For example, corruption perceptions vary greatly across both old
and new EU members and these perceptions could be important for the willingness to
abdicate sovereignty in a number of areas. The votes in recent referenda in EU member
states provide some guidance with respect to citizens’ perceptions and attitudes towards
the EU. Denmark in 2002 and Sweden in 2003 voted ‘NO‘ very strongly to participation
in the monetary union. The UK would likely vote NO if a referendum were held today.
These countries are characterized by a relatively high degree of trust in domestic
institutions and faith in the political forces shaping them. The rejection of the EU's
constitutional proposal places the Netherlands in the same category.
The ten East European countries that joined in May 2004 all voted YES rather
enthusiastically. These countries became democratic recently, corruption is still
widespread, and legal institutions are weak. Clearly, these countries perceive the EU as a
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tool for rapid strengthening of institutions. Among the older 15 EU countries, those
bordering on the Mediterranean probably belong to the same group. France, however,
may have to be placed in a separate category. Her citizens seem to have rejected the
constitutional proposal primarily based on the fear of freedom of mobility. For example,
in the area of services there is fear that the freedoms would lead to excessive "AngloSaxonization” of the EU and its institutions.
Table 1 lists three political benefit-cost categories of EU integration. The first
category is security and defence; the second is sovereignty, and the third is institutional
harmonization. It is hard to see any security considerations entering the issue of monetary
integration but the EMU raises issues of both sovereignty and institutional harmonization.
Abandoning a national currency can be viewed as a cost from a political point of view
albeit an emotional one. Political costs and benefits of institutional harmonization in the
monetary area refer to the political legitimacy of the monetary authority and the monetary
policy pursued. The German Bundesbank had strong legitimacy before the EMU was
formed while the Italian central bank had very weak legitimacy. Thus, joining the EMU
was associated with political costs in Germany but with political benefits in Italy
With this background we turn to a discussion of economic costs and benefits of
the monetary harmonization implied by participation in the EMU. In the next section we
discuss monetary policy harmonization and consequences for macroeconomic adjustment
in the EMU (summarized in Table 2.). Thereafter we turn to payment system
harmonization and consequences on the micreconomic level of the EMU (summarized in
Table 3). Other important aspects of harminization in the EU, in particular,
harmonization of trade barriers, regulation and legislation within the Internal Market, are
discussed only to the extent there is a link to monetary integration.
The alternative monetary arrangements we consider from the point of view of a
prospective EMU member are a very hard peg within, for example, a Currency Board,
and floating exchange rates.
2. Monetary policy harmonization in the EMU; The macroeconomic perspective
Participation in the EMU implies harmonization of monetary policy through the
harmonization of monetary policy making institutions. The first attempt at a European
Monetary Union was based on The Werner Report of 1970. As Wyplosz (2006) states,
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the arguments for a monetary union in this report were primarily political. Close
economic integration was viewed as a prerequisite for political integration, and a
common currency was viewed as a necessary condition for economic integration. The
Delors report, One Union, One Money, published by the European Commission in 1988,
built on the Werner report, elaborated on the economic arguments in favor of a monetary
union. The basic argument was that free capital flows make any exchange rate regime
along the spectrum between irrevocably fixed rates in a monetary union and freely
floating rates, unstable. If countries retain their rights to change pegged rates, speculative
capital flows could threaten exchange rate stability. Credibility of fixed rates could be
obtained only in a monetary union. Floating exchange rates were viewed as unacceptable
if the objectives with respect to economic integration were to be achieved.
Wyplosz (2006) points out that the disadvantages of a monetary union were
passed over rather lightly in the Delors report although the risk associated with
asymmetric shocks were mentioned. He argues that the omission of important elements
of Optimum Currency Area (OCA) theory in the Commission’s argumentation for a
common currency “is the Monetary Union’s original sin.” The OCA theory spells out
criteria for a country’s choice of exchange rate regime. This theory was well-developed
and rich already in the late 70’s with a number of criteria for exchange rate regime choice
although it was not formalized into an easily applicable set of rules balancing the
different criteria (see e.g. Tower and Willett. 1976).
The OCA literature beginning with Mundell (1961) has grown over time to
incorporate a large number of criteria, including political economy arguments, for a fixed
exchange rate versus a flexible rate. In this literature a flexible regime need not be a
“clean float” but it includes various degrees of adjustability of the exchange rate to short
run market conditions. In other words, a fixed rate is interpreted as a regime wherein
exchange rate adjustment is not used as an adjustment mechanism. (See, for example,
Tower and Willett, 1976, and Wihlborg and Willett, 1991). The OCA literature has in
common that the optimum currency area is determined as a trade-off between benefits of
exchange rate flexibility in terms of macroeconomic adjustment, and microeconomic
benefits of a common currency under a permanently fixed exchange rate. In Table 2
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Output Variability and Adjustment and Policy Instruments are the main benefit/cost
categories commonly discussed in traditional OCA analysis.
In response to increasing inflation rates during the 70s monetary theory and OCA
analyses increased their emphasis on the linkage between the exchange rate regime and
inflation (Inflation in Table 2). Simultaneously, the theory of monetary policy began to
incorporate the game theoretic concepts of time-inconsistency and credibility (e.g.
Kydland and Prescott, 1977, and Barro and Gordon, 1983). The main point in this
literature is that abandoning attempts to always achieve “first-best” using discretionary
policies can be welfare increasing, because attempts to reduce unemployment require
ever increasing inflation once the discretionary policy measures become anticipated.
Sticking to a rule for monetary policy in spite of short term costs leads to credibility of
the rule over time, and a welfare gain relative to the ineffective use of discretionary
policy in response to short term fluctuations in the economy.
The EMU, establishing irrevocably fixed exchange rates internally, and a
supra-national monetary policy-making authority, is a way for member countries to
obtain credibility provided the union’s central bank conducts a low-inflation policy with
credibility2. It is far from likely, however, that the EMU is indeed an OCA in terms of
labor market flexibility and that the EMU leaders necessarily know which countries
should be included in order to achieve that optimum area. Joining the EMU could
therefore be costly in terms of macroeconomic adjustment.
Several economists have pointed out that the costs of the EMU in terms of
macroeconomic adjustment are mitigated and even eliminated to the extent OCA criteria
for fixed exchange rates are endogenous. Such endogeneity could take the form of
increased labor mobility and increased real wage flexibility as a result of the nearly
complete credibility of fixed exchange rates within the EMU.
Evidence on endogenous institutional development enhancing wage flexibility
and mobility in labor markets in particular is reviewed and discussed in De Grauwe and
Mongelli (2005). Their “cautiously optimistic” assessment of endogenous OCA criteria is
probably the most positive one within an expanding empirical literature on labor market
adjustment in the EMU. An OECD Policy Brief on the Euro Area (July 2004) states that
2

See de Grauwe (1996)
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“Notwithstanding some progress made since the mid 1990s….Labour markets are in
urgent need for reform.” Most economists (e.g. Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2003, and
Eichengreen (2002)) studying the subject agree that wages tend to be rigid in most of the
“old EU”, and that both cross-border and intra country labor mobility is seriously absent.
Duval and Elmeskov (2005) warn that the EMU may actually weaken the incentives for
structural reforms in the larger member countries.
The recent strikes and riots in France in response to a proposed relaxation of
constraints on laying off young people offer a reminder that it is politically very hard in
many countries to change labor market institutions that benefit established groups. If
there is cross-border labor mobility in the EU, it is confined to the relatively welleducated professional groups. Ironically, governments generally seem to consider these
groups particularly valued citizens and discourage “brain drain” by means of tax policy in
particular.
The most recent members in Eastern and Central Europe with less advanced
social insurance system may have more mobile labor forces but these labor forces have
found newly erected barriers in 12 of the 15 older members. There is a widespread fear in
the latter countries that a wave of “cheap” labor will move in from the new members.
These attitudes of practical politics stand in contrast to the stated objectives of expanding
the EMU to include new members.
The verdict on endogenous flexibility in the long run is still out as noted in
Willett, Permpoon and Wihlborg (2006). They conclude that the ambivalent political
attitude towards labor mobility in many countries and the evidence so far indicate that the
traditional OCA criteria must be taken seriously for the foreseeable future.
Alternatives to joining the EMU
Even if an argument can be made in favor of the EMU as a well-functioning currency
area if endogenous institutional development is taken into account, there are alternative
arrangements available with possibly more favorable benefit-cost ratios.
The Currency Board (CB) is one realistic alternative arrangement for the
relatively small economies in Eastern and Central Europe and there are experiences to
build on if new CBs are to be developed. The CB is similar to a gold standard with
convertible currencies serving as the anchor instead of gold. The currency in circulation,
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and reserves held by banks against time and demand deposits are backed by foreign
currency reserves. The exchange rate is fixed to a specific currency and anchored in
legislation making realignments difficult and politically costly. The fixity of exchange
rates is presumed to be the foundation of stable prices and credibility in the market place.
In most CBs, there is unlimited convertibility of the local currency. In Estonia, full
convertibility between the Estonian Kroon and the reference currency has been in effect
in Estonia since 1992. The money supply grows and shrinks with foreign exchange
reserves in an open economy with no restrictions on trade, capital flows and FDI.
Although the CB implies a less irrevocably fixed exchange rate than a currency
union it is possible to make the exchange rate fixity highly credible by means of
appropriate legislation. Examples of credibility enhancing legislative measures in Estonia
are shown in the Appendix. The credibility of a CB depends on the strength of the
institutions preventing the CB managers from trying to influence the monetary base, and
to change the exchange rate. 3
The costs of a CB relative to the EMU in terms of lesser credibility need not be
substantial and must be balanced against the potential benefits of being able to abandon
the CB in an economic crisis requiring substantial factor-cost adjustment relative to
trading partners. The value of this benefit could be particularly large in Eastern and
Central Europe where the structures of the economies differ substantially from the mature
economies of the older members. These differences increase the likelihood of substantial
asymmetric shocks requiring adjustment of relative cost structures.
An alternative route to credibility of monetary policy for the individual country is
to strengthen the political independence of the central bank by constitutional and other
legislative means while allowing the exchange rate to float. There is a large literature
documenting that independent central banks with a price stability objective are able to
achieve substantial credibility and relatively low inflation without having to suffer less
growth or higher unemployment over time (see De Grauwe, 1997). The institutional
requirement for independence may be stronger than those required for a CB arrangement
but not beyond the politically feasible in countries where laws are enforceable.

3

See, for example, Sweeney (1998) for a discussion of determinants of a currency board’s credibility
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All members of the EMU must also establish central bank independence
constitutionally. The difference between the country inside and outside the EMU is that
membership in the EMU removes monetary policy making further from domestic
political forces (Burdekin, Wihlborg and Willett, 1992). This may enhance the credibility
of the ECB. On the other hand, the incentives of national governments to run fiscal
deficits as members of the EMU in combination with a weak “Stability Pact” can damage
the credibility of the ECB. Here is a case when insurance provided by the EU can damage
the credibility of the ECB. Specifically, if the EU provides implicit insurance of the
national debt of individual members, the incentives of member states to run deficits
increase.
There are a number of countries for which the central bank’s stated political
independence is not sufficient for credibility of an anti-inflation policy to be achieved
outside a monetary union. Like a credible CB, de facto independence requires
institutional and social support. The former may be, for example, contractual incentives
for central bank board members to pursue a low inflation policy, and contractual
safeguards about their positions after leaving the central bank board. Social support may
take the form of approval within the social elite of independent conduct while a board
member. Some transition economies and many developing countries lack both the
institutional support and the social traditions that could ensure de facto independence
even if the central bank is made formally independent of political authorities. Thus,
formal central bank independence under exchange rate flexibility is not sufficient to gain
credibility in these countries. Even a strongly pegged exchange rate may be insufficient
as long as the central bank has the authority to conduct discretionary monetary policy.
It is clear from the above discussion—summarized in Table 2--that there are
alternative paths to achieving credibility, and that there are costs of retaining credibility
inside or outside the EMU. Market participants are always suspicious and in need of a
confirmation. It is performance and its consistency that garners credibility. That
performance is not necessarily a function of the size of the country, nor its affiliation with
the EU (EU members have often behaved erratically and outside the confines of the EU).
A case in point is Estonia: a country that has achieved international economic credibility
well before its admission to the EU. Other countries may be more susceptible to short
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term political pressures even if formal monetary policy independence has been
established. Membership in the EMU could then be seen as an insurance (see Table 2)
against the failure of domestic institutions.
The mutuality of dependence within the EMU can support credibility if its
institutional strength is derived from the relatively disciplined countries with strong
institutions but serious problems can arise if the less disciplined countries set the policy
tone. The seemingly harsh treatment of Lithuania’s application to join the EMU can be
due to the fear among the original EMU participants that their monetary policy
preferences would receive less weight if all the new members would be allowed in as
soon as they satisfy the convergence criteria. Thus, there is an unwillingness of providing
“credibility insurance” for the new EU members through monetary harmonization.
Summarizing the arguments with respect to a possible trade off between benefits
of insurance and net costs of monetary harmonization, the benefits of insurance are
particularly relevant for countries with weak institutional support behind a formally
independent central bank. The costs of harmonization arise for countries with relatively
little ability to adjust to macroeconomic shocks under a fixed exchange rate, while there
are benefits in the form of enhanced credibility of a monetary policy rule. In Section 5 we
return to these issues in the Asian context.

3. Payment system harmonization in the EMU. The microeconomic perspective
As mentioned, the traditional OCA literature states that macroeconomic costs of fixed
exchange rates should be traded off against microeconomic benefits. Table 3 lists three
categories of potential benefits; reduced costs of currency exchange, reduced exchange
rate risk in international trade, and improved information contents of prices in
international trade. The Delors report put substantial emphasis on these factors as sources
of benefits of a common currency. Clearly, the exchange risk- and information content
components of these potential benefits would be very similar under a credible hard peg
and a monetary union. The currency exchange cost would remain, however. Estimates of
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these costs from before the formation of the EMU varied between 0.1 and 0.5 percent of
GDP. 4
The exchange risk component is often emphasized in the discussion of exchange
rate regimes but most likely highly exaggerated. One reason is that derivatives markets
allow hedging of short term exchange rate risk. A second and perhaps more important
reason is that reducing exchange rate risk within the EU does not necessarily imply that
the total risk facing a firm is reduced. Over longer time horizons exchange rate
movements are related to macroeconomic shocks that exist under any regime. If so, there
will be adjustment of other macroeconomic variables instead of the exchange rate.
Even if we accept the premise that there is short term exchange rate volatility
unrelated to macroeconomic determinants of exchange rates in a floating system,
exchange rate stability as a policy objective is often misguided. Consider total variability
(V T ) to be the sum of two components, anticipated variability (V A ) and unanticipated
variability V U ):
(1)

V T =V A +V U .

V A is easily and regularly incorporated in interest rate differentials and forward exchange
rates in money and exchange markets. V U on the other hand can be hedged using options, forward- or futures contracts, or numerous methods to adjust balance sheets. Hedging
can be costly, however, if markets for relevant financial instruments are not welldeveloped and liquid. Thus the issue of costs of exchange rate instability can be viewed
as a mirror image of financial market development. Countries may choose to consider
exchange rate stability an outright policy objective rather than implementing reforms
contributing to financial market development.
There is a controversial issue whether exchange rate stability also promotes price
stability more generally. Since price level volatility generally is strongly correlated with
the inflation rate, this issue can be viewed as the question whether fixed or flexible
exchange rates are most consistent with low inflation. This question was discussed in the
previous section.
4
Reduced transaction costs and reduced risk in international trade leads to trade creation but there ar no
welfare reducing trade diversion effects occurring in response to discriminatory trade policy. A reduction of
transactions costs among some countries relative to others increases trade among these countries at the
expense of trade with other countries but this shift is not trade diversion, since the other countries are no
longer competitive.
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It is ultimately an empirical issue whether a fixed exchange rate and a monetary
union contributes to trade creation as a result of reduced transaction and information
costs of the type discussed. The evidence on this issue is very weak. Until very recently
the evidence indicated that trade creation effects of fixed exchange rates are negligible
and in some studies even reversed (Glick and Wihlborg, 1997), but more recently Rose
(2000) argues that the EMU has led to and will continue to lead to very sizeable trade
creation. Baldwin (2006) states that the “consensus” figure for the trade expansion caused
by the EMU is 13 percent. However, Dominguez notes that this trade expansion may not
have been caused by the EMU since non-EMU members of the EU experienced trade
expansion of at least the same magnitude. The period since January 1999 has also been
characterized by a worldwide expansion of trade. Thus, the case for substantial trade
creating effects of a monetary union remains to be made in a comparison with floating
rates. In a comparison with a hard peg in CB arrangement, the case is even weaker.
Ultimately, openness and trade flows thrive in environments characterized by stable
growth wherein political pressures for protectionism are low.
Even if exchange rate stability does not have a significant impact on trade in
goods and services, a case can be made that financial markets tend to become more
integrated in a currency union. The question is whether financial market integration is
endogenous relative to monetary integration.
If a monetary union enhances the liquidity, depth and informativeness of
securities markets, households could benefit from improved risk-sharing and firms from
reduced capital costs.
A major challenge in any analysis of EMU in this respect is to distinguish
between consequences of EMU and of EU reforms more broadly. We turn first to specific
securities markets with a focus on effects of reduced transactions costs. Thereafter risksharing and payments system effects are discussed.
Bond and Equity markets. There is evidence reviewed in Mongelli and Vega
(2006) that the costs associated with internationalization of bond and stock portfolios
have decreased since the euro was introduced, and that investors in the EU and the EMU
have increased the EU component of their portfolios relative to the domestic component.
The question remains to what extent these developments depend on the euro or on
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liberalization of securities markets within the EU through, for example, the Investment
Services Directive. The indications so far are that the euro could be important for the
integration of bond markets but less so for stock markets.
Already before EMU there was substantial foreign portfolio investment in the
equity markets in Europe. The US and the UK were the major foreign investors. These
countries have kept or even expanded their large role in the form of investments by
mutual and pension funds. At the same time, equity markets investments have
expanded in continental Europe in response to EU reforms and increased attention to
corporate governance issues. Financial markets have de facto been “AngloSaxonized”. In this process mutual funds have expanded their role in the continental
European countries. These developments are still in the early stages and they would
most certainly continue with or without the euro. Forbes (2005) finds that stock
market correlations within the Euro-zone have increased by 16 percent, but during
the same period the correlation with the U.S. market increased by 25 percent.
The financial markets where the euro is likely to play the most important role
are the markets for government bonds and potentially for corporate bonds. Dermine
(2003) argues that increased substitutability of government bonds issued in different
countries will lead to a Europe wide market for government bonds. The absence of
differential currency risk on bonds issued by governments in the Euro-area implies
that Euro-area bonds differ only in terms of government default risk, which should be
reflected in yield differentials if there is no EU-guarantee behind bonds issued by
individual governments. Gaspar and Hartmann (2005) show that the cross sectional
standard deviation of interbank interest rates in the money markets have declined
drastically as a result of the removal of the exchange risk component in cross-country
interbank lending.
The existence of one or several deep markets for government bonds markets can
also help contribute to the development of efficient corporate bond markets in the euro
area. The German government bond can serve as an efficient benchmark for pricing of
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corporate bonds denominated in euro. Although bank debt still is the dominant source of
financing for firms in continental Europe the euro may play a positive role in the
development of increasingly efficient markets for corporate bonds.
In the bond markets as in equity markets, the development of an
infrastructure for trading and issuing securities in the EU is a prerequisite for
integrated markets. The studies of equity market integration reviewed in Mongelli
and Vega (2006) indicate that increased integration in the EU is part of the
globalization process worldwide, as well as of increased importance of equity markets
in the EU following from an increasingly Anglo-Saxon regulatory structure.
Risk-sharing: Studies in the US indicate that state specific shocks are smoothed to a
substantial degree through capital markets (40% according to Asdrubali, Sørensen and
Yosha, 1996). Similar studies in Europe by Marinheiro (2003) and Melita (2004) find
that most of the smoothing in Europe occurs through national government budgets, and
that interregional lending plays a relatively small role in the Eurozone. The expansion of
stock and bond markets in Europe during the last 10 years is likely to increase the role of
financial markets in risk-sharing in Europe.
The effects of EU and the EMU on trade, output and income fluctuations
influence opportunities and demand for risk-sharing in financial markets. There are two
dimensions to risk-sharing through financial markets. First, income fluctuations create a
demand for consumption smoothing through credit markets. Second, portfolio investors
seek to diversify risk of individual securities and other sources of income in order to
obtain the best possible risk-return trade-off.
Increased intra industry trade increases correlations of returns across countries.
Thereby, opportunities for diversification across EMU countries decreases and the
demand for diversification through investments outside the EMU and the EU increases.
Income smoothing opportunities through borrowing and lending within the EMU would
also be relatively small to the extent economic fluctuations are correlated. Thus, with an
expansion of intra industry trade risk-sharing opportunities within the EMU decline and
efficient risk –sharing requires integration with financial markets outside the EMU. On
the other hand, increased specialization would reduce correlations of returns within the
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EMU and increase the opportunities for diversification by investing in a multi-country
EMU portfolio. The need for diversification outside the EU would be less than in the
previous case. Consumption smoothing can be accomplished through borrowing and
lending within the EMU to the extent specialization implies non-correlated output
fluctuations.
Turning to empirical evidence, Willett, Permpoon and Wihlborg (2006) present
output correlations indicating that the expansion in trade has been intra industry. This
observation is supported by Giannone and Reichlin (2006). Eiling, Gerard and de Roon
(2005) have found that country returns in equity markets have become less volatile and
more correlated in the euro area during the late 90s. Instead industry returns have become
more volatile and less correlated. Thus, diversification obtained by means of crosscountry diversification in the early 90s can now be achieved through cross industry
diversification. This cross industry diversification cannot be obtained within each euro
member but some international diversification within the euro area is necessary. Thus,
reductions in transaction costs for intra EMU investments contribute to risk-sharing
opportunities. Also, substantial diversification gains with respect to country risk are
available through investments outside the EMU and the EU. Integration of financial
markets across, for example, the Atlantic, remain important for risk-sharing opportunities
and increasingly important to the extent European economies become more integrated.
Payment system effectiveness. The role of EMU in the payments system may seem
obvious in the sense that the member countries abandon their individual currencies
in favor of the common currency. Thereby, costs of currency exchange can be
reduced. The quantitative importance of these effects is questionable and indirectly
analyzed in studies of, for example, the trade effects of EMU.
In spite of the common currency, cross border payments within the EMU remain
several times more expensive than domestic payments. The reason is that banking
systems, and clearing and payment systems remain nationally oriented, and that legal
systems differ with respect to some securities. Gaspar and Hartmann (2005) view these
differences as obstacles to further integration of financial markets.
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4. Likely costs and benefits in an Asian currency union context.
Wyplosz (2002) argued that the logical next step after a pegged rate is a hard peg within
the context of a union of sort. He reasoned that the unholy trinity (capital mobility,
independent monetary policy and fixed exchange rates) involves a clear tradeoff between
policy independence and exchange rate fixity. He concluded that since all floats have
been dirty, and since adjustable pegs have caused more dislocation than they have solved,
that a hard peg is the answer. But the hard pegs, he argued, that the currency boards of
Argentina, Hong Kong and Estonia were built upon did not work either. Khoury and
Wihlborg ( KW, 2006) demonstrate that this is a weak argument since it ignores the
degree of orthodoxy of the CB and the level of government manipulation of money
supply in the CBs. KW further demonstrated the success and its foundation of the CB
experiment in Estonia, and showed that continuation with a CB may very well be
preferable for Estonia in lieu of EU membership. Asian countries need to have all of
these options and their implications considered with careful attention to their benefits and
costs.
The benefit/cost categories listed in Tables 2 and 3 need to be evaluated for each
potential currency union member to reach firm conclusions about the most suitable
candidates for an East Asian currency union. This task is beyond the scope of this article
but we can point so some differences between East Asian countries, the Central and
Eastern European countries that recently joined or are joining the EU, and the Western
European countries now participating in the EMU. We can also draw parallels between
Asian countries and some Central and Eastern European countries. The latter are
candidates for EMU participation and already members of the EU.
One major difference between the candidate countries for EMU membership and
the East Asian countries is that the former group is joining an already functioning
currency union with established institutions while the latter group does not have a plan
with respect to transition to a new currency, to institutional aspects such as decision
making procedures, and to the issue whether a new currency will be formed or all
members will adopt one of the existing currencies like the Yen or the Rembimbi.
Alternative versions of irrevocably fixed rates like dollarization, and very hard pegs like
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currency board arrangements and hard pegs with cooperative intervention policies, cn be
considered as well.
Another difference is that the recent members of the EU are joining a broad and
far-reaching integration process by becoming members of the Internal Market and
associated institutions in the EU, while Asian countries have few institutional structures
in common.
The countries (or provinces) under consideration in East Asia could include
Japan, S. Korea, China, Hong Kong, Taiwan (if politics permit), Thailand, Malaysia,
Singapore, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Indonesia and the Philippines. The countries range
from advanced industrialized to relatively poor developing countries. Their political
systems are different and the economic structures are different. The last five countries
have a relatively large share of raw materials in their international trade. In comparison
with Europe, including Central and Eastern Europe, the trade of the Asian economies is
oriented towards third countries like the USA to a much higher degree than the trade of
European countries.
The first benefit/cost category in Table 2 for effects of monetary policy
harmonization is inflation. Unlike many European countries the Asian economies have
generally shown a high degree of monetary discipline. Thus, the benefit of importing
credibility does not seem to have the same weight in Asia as in Europe. On the cost side
policy preferences with respect to a monetary and fiscal policy mix could be very
different, however. Concerns about deficit financing of individual countries has been a
major issue in the EMU as well as in the Maastricht transition criteria. The latter includes
a limit on the budget deficit as well as on the national debt as percent of GDP. The
differences in political systems and fiscal policy making procedures are likely to be much
greater in Asia than in Europe. Thus, a “stability pact” referring to limits on fiscal deficits
could be harder to enforce in Asia than in Europe (where enforcement is not successful).
On the other hand, the Asian countries may be less likely than the EU to implicitly
guarantee each others’ national debts. Thereby, the interest rates on each individual
country’s debt should be more responsive than in the European case. On the whole,
inflation and fiscal discipline should not be a major concern in most of the Asian
economies.
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Output stability--the second benefit cost category in Table 2-- could be an issue
for countries where real shocks are more important than shocks emanating from the
financial sector. It is well accepted that a floating exchange rate can serve as an automatic
stabilizer for real shocks. Within the group of Asian countries, this issue could be
important for the relatively raw material oriented and poorer economies that do not have
a very well diversified industrial structure.
Adjustment and use of policy instruments in response to shocks—the third
category in Table 2—is very much a topic of OCA and, as noticed, the issue has come up
in the debate about the EMU after its formation. There are three main aspects to this
issue: (i) are asymmetric shocks a frequent and large concern for the currency area?, (ii)
is the degree of labor mobility or wage flexibility sufficient within the currency area, and
(iii) can fiscal transfers smooth consumption when different parts of the currency area is
impacted asymmetrically? The fiscal transfer system is likely to be almost non-existent in
an Asian currency union. In the EMU the transfer system is small relative to the situation
in the USA but some methods of transfer exists. If there is little labor mobility and wage
rigidity when currency members are hit by shocks asymmetrically, exchange rate
adjustment is an effective policy instrument and there are costs associated with a
currency union. The performance of the Asian economies in this respect varies. Large
parts of most of the economies are not unionized but unions seem to be strong in some
sectors in, for example, South Korea. Thus, in comparison with Europe asymmetric
shocks are most likely more important but wage flexibility in most of the countries is
likely to be higher. Labor mobility between countries is bound to be very low, however.
Thus, the cost of giving up the exchange rate as a policy instrument depends very much
on wage flexibility in the individual countries. Events during the Asian crisis indicates
that exchange rates can play a positive role in adjustment.
Among the issues contributing to costs or benefits of a monetary union there is
finally the insurance aspect. In the discussion of the EMU we mentioned in particular that
the country with weak, inflation prone political institutions and little central bank
independence could benefit from a monetary union. The currency union “ties the hands”
of policy makers with respect to inflation prone policies. We noted above that most Asian
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countries have shown stronger monetary discipline than many European countries. Thus,
the need for this type of insurance is most likely less in Asia than in Europe.
Turning to benefits and costs as a result of payment system integration in Table 3
we have expressed scepticism about the importance of costs of currency exchange for
international trade. We are similarly sceptical about the degree to which a currency union
enhances the information content of prices. The currency risk issue is likely to be an
important argument for policy makers favoring a currency union, however.
It is widely believed that exchange rate risk discourages trade substantially.
Although we expressed scepticism on this point as well for European countries, exchange
rate risk can be a greater concern in Asia where financial markets are less developed in
many countries and, therefore, hedging short term exchange rate risk can be costly.
Risk sharing in financial markets is also made more costly if financial markets are
not well developed. The benefits of risk sharing through international diversification
within an Asian currency union could be greater in Asia than in Europe since business
cycles fluctuations in the Asian economies are less synchronized by trade flows. Thus,
the benefits from capital flows among the Asian countries could be large. Recent
proposals to develop markets for Asian bonds for both governments and corporations
indicate that financial market development is an important policy concern. Not only
would there be benefits in terms of risk-sharing but corporations would have access to a
deeper and more liquid market than in individual countries. The question is then whether
a currency union would contribute strongly to a reduction in transactions costs and risk in
financial market transactions in Asia.
The evidence from Europe indicates that bond markets indeed have become more
regional and deeper after the EMU was formed. The currency union effect cannot be
disentangled from effects of institutional developments, however. In the EU the
harmonization of rules, increasing competition in securities markets, increased
transparency of corporate governance systems, cross-border operations of brokers as well
as trading platforms have progressed rapidly. We believe that these developments by far
outstrip the currency risk factor in importance. This conclusion is based on the ability of
non-EMU countries within the EU to take advantage of EU wide securities markets as
much EMU members.
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The evidence from the EU indicates that institutional reform of financial markets
enabling competition and cross-border trading should be the priority if governments are
serious about improving opportunities for risk sharing and corporations’ access to liquid
securities markets. Developments if financial markets contribute to lowering the costs of
hedging exchange rate risk as well. The benefits of the creation of a currency union are
themselves likely to be relatively small. These benefits would have to be weighed against
the potential costs of removing a macroeconomic adjustment mechanism for countries
with relatively rigid labor markets and sensitivity to terms of trade shocks.
There are less rigid exchange rate arrangements than a currency union that could
allow a more favorable trade-off between costs and benefits. For example, Estonia has
become one of the greatest successes among the transition economies in Eastern and
Central Europe with a Currency Board (CB) arrangement. After becoming independent as
a result of the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991, Estonia quickly reformed its
economy. The central bank was assigned the role of a CB in April 1992. This reform was
a centerpiece in a package of economic reforms establishing a very open and liberal
economy. Europe.
The potential benefits and costs of an EMU membership on the macro
level for Estonia are linked to the added credibility of an irrevocably fixed rate in periods
when severe shocks affect Estonia and most of Western Europe asymmetrically. The
added credibility of the EMU under extreme conditions carries a cost, since the
credibility is linked to the complete loss of the exchange rate as an adjustment
mechanism. Under a CB arrangement the exchange rate could be changed as an
“adjustment of last resort”, while leaving the EMU must be considered a viable response
only under desperate circumstances.
The CB as a viable and nearly equivalent alternative to EMU membership
requires that the CB has high credibility. This credibility depends also on a country’s
ability to adjust to shocks without exchange rate adjustment. Estonia’s success has been
explained by flexible labor markets, high capital mobility, free trade, a well functioning
financial system and a disciplined fiscal policy. 5 These factors contribute to the
economy’s ability to adjust to shocks and to the credibility of the CB. The same factors
5

See Khoury and Wihlborg (2006)
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are not required to achieve credibility as a member of the EMU, but they are required to
avoid costs of participation in a currency area.

5. Concluding remarks
The empirical evidence on Europe’s experiment with the EMU has led to the conclusion
that the experiment has been rather successful so far and that it can perhaps show Asian
countries the way towards their own version of a monetary union.
The road to such an experiment has been very long and costly indeed. Meanwhile
the ideas offered to Asian countries have not been in short supplies. No one can argue
that a monetary union is indeed possible if everyone adopts the yen or the Yuan as the
currency for Asia with appropriate institutional arrangements. Alternatively, one could
have a single currency like the Yuan whose convertibility in Asia is assured and have all
other Asian currencies pegged to it. Kwan (1994) argued for a Yen-based currency
system for East Asia.
Eichengreen and Bayoumi (1996) developed an index for the optimum currency
area (OCA) for Asia and found that the countries are not ready for such. Wyplosz (2002)
enumerated the following sufficient reasons for an area to develop a union: strong
economic integration through trade, falling barriers to capital and labor flows. Both are
achievable as world trade now overshadows the largest of GDP’s and as the WTO works
ever harder to bring down barriers. Yet, the state of the development of Asia’s economic
and political systems remains a cause for concerns. There are few Asian institutions that
could possibly be relied upon to further the idea of a union: APEC, ASEAN, CER, etc.,
but these institutions are neither fully inclusive nor well structured. The Chiang Mai
arrangement that allows for mutual swap arrangements to defend Asian currencies is a
hopeful sign. It is close to a restrictive version of an EMS that preceded the EMU.
Monetary unions like those of Europe and (arguably) the US involve much harder
steps to take for Asia when compared to Currency Boards, dollarization and a peg. A
currency union carries with it substantial risks for several Asian economies; in particular
in terms of adjustment to asymmetric shocks. These risks must be weighed against
potential benefits in the financial markets in particular. There is hope for a substantial
improvement of institutional conditions in Asian financial markets with a potential for
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much greater benefits than those associated with a currency union. Attention to such
institutional development is likely to have a much higher pay-off without touching on
political sensitivities than efforts to form a currency union.
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Table 1. Political benefits and the costs of joining the EU from a Central-Eastern
European perspective.
Costs

Benefits

Security
Sovereignty

Institutional
harmonization

Greater security relative
to the Russian Bear
Greater influence on
EU decisions of great
relevance whether
member or not

If EU institutions have
greater legitimacy than
national institutions
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Loss of sovereignty in
some respects (Less
influence in decision
making bodies
affecting domestic
rules)
If EU institutions have
lower legitimacy than
national institutions

Alternative
arrangement
Benefits and
Costs
Reliance on
NATO alone

Table 2.Monetary Policy Harmonization; Macroeconomic effects of the EMU
Benefits

Costs

Inflation

A tool to obtain CBLess responsiveness to
independence
domestic policy
a. Reduced inflation preferences
a. Short term
b. Importing
policy
credibility
(depending on domestic
b. Long term
alternative)
inflation trend

Output stability

Output stability
depending on nature of
shocks (real or nominal
rigidity?)

Instability depending
on nature of shocks
(real or nominal
rigidity?)

Adjustment and
policy
instruments

Greater domestic
flexibility induced by
inability to change
exchange rate.
(Endogenous flexibility)

Loss of instrument for
BoP adjustment (real
or nominal rigidity
without endogenous
flexibility)

Insurance

Handing authority to
ECB, If institutional
support for a politically
independent central bank
is lacking,

Implicit insurance of
national debt
strengthens incentives
to run fiscal deficits
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Alternative:
Strong
Currency
Board or
constitutionally
independent
Central Bank
with inflation
target and float
Benefit and
cost can be
obtained if
institutions
obtain strong
credibility

Credible
Currency
Board like
Monetary
union. Float
reverses
benefits and
costs
Credible
Currency
Board like
Monetary
union. Float
reverses
benefits and
costs

Table 3: Payment System Harmonization; Microeconomic consideration

Benefits
Costs of currency
exchange

Currency risk

Transparency

Costs

Trade creation:
Reduced transaction
costs in cross-border
payments within
EMU.
Risk-sharing in
financial markets
Trade creation:
Trade reduction:
Reduced exchange
Potential increase in
rate risk
macro-exposure:
Risk.sharing
a. exchange
rate regime
related
b. reduced
diversification
Trade creation:
Information
contents of prices
Risk-sharing
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Alternative:
Same as in Table 2
Negates potential
benefit

Currency Board like
monetary union.
Float reverses
benefits and costs

Currency Board like
monetary union.
Float negates
benefit
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